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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines the degree to which net payments from federal crop insurance products 
impact cash rents paid for farmland. A spatial panel model is employed to control for spatial 
dependence and heterogeneity in cash rental rates.  Results show that producers factor a 
statistically significant proportion of the value received from crop insurance into cash rents.  
However, the directly measurable rate is lower than found in previous studies.   This result 
likely reflects the complexity in the relationship between losses and crop insurance rates, and 
the aggregation across producers in both measured rent and estimates of the net value of crop 
insurance to a producer.  Further, the indirect effects of crop insurance and the ancillary 
impacts of a producer’s risk profile are difficult to identify independently due to the highly 
variable nature of crop insurance payments, and the smoothed nature of cash rental values.  
Nonetheless, even as the model removes much of the variation in the data, this analysis shows 
crop insurance is an important factor in a producer’s expected revenue, as cash rents are 
positively affected in counties that receive consistent and positive net value. 
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
1.1 - Purpose and Contribution 
Low interest rates coupled with large commodity price increases resulted in record high 
agricultural land values around 2014 before receding slightly over the past two years.  Cash 
rents and crop insurance subsidies closely tracked the increase and decline in land values, 
growing to record levels in 2014 before decreasing through 2016.  The growth in Federal crop 
insurance, specifically the growth in premium subsidies, has exposed federal crop insurance to 
increased public scrutiny.  For this reason, understanding the impacts of crop insurance on cash 
rents is vital as the program and producers move forward.  This thesis seeks to quantify the 
impacts of crop insurance on cash rents. 
The discussion of farmland values in literature is extensive and continues to grow (Benirschka & 
Binkley, 1994; PIantinga et al., 2002; Patton & McErlean, 2003; Huang et al., 2006; Livanis et al., 
2006; Woodard, 2010; Baylis et al., 2011).  This thesis contributes to that discussion by 
analyzing impacts of crop insurance on cash rents using county level panel data.  Datasets with 
locational information have contributed to the growth of interest in spatial econometric 
methods.  Identification strategies find both spatial structure (spatial heterogeneity) and spatial 
interactions (spatial autocorrelation) in the data used in this analysis.  Therefore, the spatial 
model used incorporates relationships that exist through time and locations, and provides a 
more efficient estimate of the impacts of crop insurance on cash rents. 
The analysis in this study examines 985 counties that fall within the 12 state Midwestern region 
of the United States.  The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Economic Research 
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Service separates these 12 states into three different farm resource regions based on their 
specialization in production of farm commodities.  These regions are the Corn Belt (Iowa, 
Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, and Missouri), the Lake States (Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Michigan), and 
the Northern Plains (North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, and Kansas).  These 12 states 
constituted $62.2 billion of the $99.3 billion (62.6%) in total liability in the crop insurance 
program in 2016 (RMA, 2017). 
Critical input for this analysis originated from the iFarm Crop Insurance Decision Tool that the 
farmdoc team at the University of Illinois developed and maintains.  Among other things, the 
iFarm Crop Insurance Decision tool uses a variety of different historical and current factors to 
calculate the long run expected “net cost of crop insurance” (net cost) to a producer.  
Differences in net costs arise due to mis-ratings, which producers can exploit in their crop 
insurance selection process.   
This study employs a similar variable to net cost as a measurement of benefit to producers.  Net 
value of crop insurance (net value) is calculated as compensation for damage or loss 
(indemnity) plus the portion of premium paid by the federal government (subsidy) minus the 
total premium.  Dividing this value by total acres insured returns a per acre measure of the net 
value in any given year.  When insurance is rated fairly, net cost equals the amount of subsidy.   
Crop insurance impacts cash rents through two different mechanisms.  First, producers may 
rebalance risk when purchasing crop insurance.  Variation of returns represents one of the 
largest risks to producers when cash rents are negotiated.  Crop insurance reduces variation of 
returns and therefore the producer’s risk.  Assuming that a producer has a certain risk 
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tolerance, reduction in risk from crop insurance may result in risk being shifted to other areas 
of their operation to restore risk to its preferred level.  Second, due to discernable patterns of 
net value, producers potentially factor net values into cash rents. This thesis focuses on that 
effect. 
The results suggest that higher net value of crop insurance is associated with higher cash rental 
rates.  In other words, as producers experience consistent excess benefits of crop insurance, 
they are willing to factor these benefits into cash rental rates.  The consistency of payments 
plays a critical role in determining the portion of each dollar factored into rental rates.  Because 
cash rents are sticky (Carson & Langemeier, 2017), producers require that net value from the 
crop insurance program be consistent before they factor expected net value into cash rents. As 
net value does become consistent through time and producer’s expectations of the crop 
insurance program change, producers factor a statistically significant proportion of net value 
into rental rates.  However, the economic significance of net value’s impact presents a different 
story.  Producers factor as much as $0.01 of each additional $1.00 in net value into cash rents, 
depending on the consistency of the payments.  These findings represent a significantly smaller 
proportion in comparison to other forms of government payments, such as direct payments 
(Van Herck et al, 2013).  
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1.2 - Overview 
This thesis is organized into six sections.  Following this introduction, Chapter 2 provides 
background on the history and complexity of the federal crop insurance program.  Chapter 3 
reviews previous literature focused on farmland valuation and cash rents.  Specifically, Chapter 
3 traces the progression of the literature towards hedonic price models in farmland value 
analysis.   Chapter 4 introduces the theory behind the model design and selection and discusses 
the data used in this analysis.  Chapter 5 reports the results and discusses the potential 
implications.  Finally, chapter 6 completes this thesis with a conclusion and discussion. 
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CHAPTER 2 - BACKGROUND 
Agricultural economists have studied the effects of government programs on farmland values 
dating back to the mid-1960s (Herdt & Cochrane, 1966).  Similar to previous federal agriculture 
programs, crop insurance faces public scrutiny.  The scrutiny has intensified as public subsidies 
for crop insurance have grown over the past decade.  Crop insurance subsidies, farm real estate 
prices, and cash rents have each more than doubled during the past two decades across the 
Midwest.  As a result, many suspect crop insurance plays a causal role in the increase in land 
values and cash rents.  Figures 1-4 show trends in land values, cash rents, and crop insurance 
subsidies.  Subsidies for federal crop insurance in the 2016 crop year were $6.89 billion of the 
$9.08 billion in total premium, while producers paid the remainder (RMA, 2017).   As of 2016, 
farm real estate in the United States is valued at over $2.4 trillion, representing over 80% of all 
farm assets (USDA, 2017).   
Figures 1-3 display trends in land values, cash rents, and year-over-year changes in land values.  
On average, the Corn Belt experienced the largest increases, gaining over $4,000 per/acre in 
value between 2000 and 2016.  Northern Plains land values experienced the widest range of 
percent changes during the same period, from increases of 26.89% in 2012 to decreases of 
5.94% in 2016.  As expected, rent values follow a similar path to farmland values, experiencing 
the rapid rise followed by a slow decline.  Myriad factors affect farmland values though, 
whereas expected income is the main driver of cash rents.  
The capitalization rate of farmland is a common measure of the relative price of farmland.  
Calculated by dividing yearly rent by total value, the capitalization rate measures the amount 
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buyers pay for current earnings to farmland.  Schnitkey (2016) shows strong correlation 
between capitalization rates and the U.S.  ten-year treasury yield.  Intuitively this is 
understandable, as raising interest rates increases financing costs while also offering an 
investment alternative.   
Cash rent leasing agreements continue to increase in popularity across the Midwest.  Data from 
the Illinois Farm Business Farm Management (FBFM) Association show cash rented farmland 
increased from 40% to 43% of total farmland between 2010 and 2015 (FBM, 2016).  Producers 
benefit most from cash rent leasing agreements during favorable growing seasons when 
realized revenue exceeds the expected revenue amount.   However, because cash rents are 
fixed costs, producers bear all the risk during inferior growing seasons. 
Producers consider an array of factors when establishing rental agreements with property 
owners.  These factors include land productivity, the variability of those crop returns, field size 
and shape, drainage, ease of access, market access, local market prices, potential for wildlife 
damage, field perimeter characteristics, competition for rented cropland in a region, and crop 
insurance (Ward, 2015).   
2.1 - Crop Insurance: History and Performance 
Agriculture production is an inherently risky business whereby producers face a variety of 
production impediments ranging from adverse weather and pests to natural disasters such as 
fire (Goodwin & Smith, 1995).  The frequency of adverse events coupled with their severity led 
directly to the creation of a federal crop insurance program in the 1930s.   Enacted in 1938, the 
Crop Insurance Act was a direct response to the Dust Bowl and Great Depression.  The initial 
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crop insurance program insured only yields.  High premiums and low participation rates 
hindered the growth of the program to such an extent that Congress discontinued federal crop 
insurance in 1943 before reenacting it in 1945.   
Low participation rates continued to plague the program though until the Crop Insurance Act of 
1980.  This act introduced premium subsidies and expanded the availability of crop insurance to 
additional crops and regions of the country.  Congress initially capped premium subsidies at 
30% of the premium at the 65% coverage level.  While participation levels increased, the need 
for congress to issue ad hoc disaster payments after adverse events persisted.  As disaster relief 
payments became annualized and larger, incentives to participate in the voluntary federal crop 
insurance program were further diminished (Goodwin & Smith, 1995).   
Beginning in the early 1990’s, proponents of crop insurance criticized the “annual” ad hoc 
disaster relief programs.  They placed blame directly on ad hoc payments for competing with 
Federal Crop insurance, and lobbied for change.  Congress responded with the Federal Crop 
Insurance Reform Act of 1994.  One of the many changes, this Act required producers 
participate in the federal crop insurance program to be eligible for other federal agriculture 
programs such as deficiency payments and certain loan programs.   
Catastrophic (CAT) crop insurance originated with the 1994 Act.  CAT crop insurance offers a 
minimal cost alternative for producers who want the minimal amount of coverage while 
remaining eligible for federal benefits.  The federal government completely subsidizes 
premiums for CAT, while producers pay a onetime service fee for each crop they grow, in each 
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county grown.  CAT coverage compensates producers for crop yield losses that exceed 50% of 
historical yield at a rate of 55% of the projected season average market price.   
Following the 1994 Act, participation in the Federal crop insurance program increased 
drastically, with enrolled acres more than doubling from roughly 100 million in 1994 to over 
220 million in 1995.  As the program grew, the Risk Management Agency (RMA) was created to 
administer Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC) programs and other non-insurance-
related risk management and education programs that help support U.S. agriculture. 
In 2000, Congress raised the subsidy rates and made several changes to RMA, including 
allowing them to enter into contracts or partnerships with private entities that developed and 
maintained crop insurance products.  The public-private partnerships expanded the number 
and quality of crop insurance products offered to producers.   
The price of premiums encompasses the most important factor when deciding whether to 
participate in crop insurance (Sherrick et al., 2003).  However, price is only one facet of the 
selection process.  Individual producer characteristics, such as risk tolerance, also influence a 
producer’s decision.  Kirwan (2014) finds that farm operators that purchase crop insurance tend 
to be younger and more highly educated than operators who forgo crop insurance.  Farms with 
crop insurance also tend to have higher revenues and leverage compared to their counterparts.  
While leverage refers to financed debt, cash rental agreements represent a significant financial 
obligation not recorded on farm balance sheets.  Accordingly, Sherrick et al (2003) find that 
among many factors, cash rental obligations play an important role in the crop insurance 
selection process.   
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Currently, crop insurance protects over 297 million acres of farmland with an insured liability of 
over $99 billion (RMA, 2017).  The two categories of crop insurance used today are yield and 
revenue insurance.  Revenue insurance combines the production guarantee of yield-based 
policies and a price guarantee to create an instrument that protects against revenue loss from 
deficient yields, price declines, or both.  RMA introduced revenue insurance in 1996 to corn and 
soybean producers in Nebraska and Iowa.  Revenue insurance quickly became a favorite of 
producers and RMA expanded its availability to the rest of the country by 2003.   Of the 2.07 
million crop insurance policies sold in 2016, revenue-based policies accounted for 74% (1.54 
million).   
Table 1 displays the subsidy rates schedule for federal crop insurance as of 2016. Other than for 
catastrophic crop insurance, coverage levels play an important role in determining subsidy 
rates.  Tables 2 – 4 display descriptive statistics of the federal crop insurance program, sorted 
first by year, and then by the states analyzed in this thesis. The tables show that premiums, 
subsidies, and indemnity payments all trended upwards the past two decades before shrinking 
slightly the past few years. The price-level effect of commodities explains much of the increase 
in size of all three. The cost of insurance closely tracked commodity prices upwards as corn, 
wheat, and soybean prices soared in the mid-to-late 2000’s. Because subsidies are calculated as 
a proportion of total premiums, subsidies grew as premiums grew.  
2.2 - Federal Crop Insurance Subsidies 
Economists agree that increasing the subsidy rates for crop insurance led directly to the growth 
of the program, but they disagree about why and if subsidies are needed (Zulauf, 2016).  While 
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proponents of crop insurance endorse its effectiveness at reducing variation in agricultural 
returns, opponents rally against subsidizing a program plagued by systemic risk, moral hazard, 
and adverse selection.  Proponents of the subsidy point out the need for widespread 
enrollment in the program to achieve a functioning insurance market.  Insurance markets 
function best when non-systemic risks are spread across a pool of risk averse individuals 
(Goodwin & Smith, 1995).  Diversifying away all risk in crop insurance markets remains difficult 
though, as adverse events, like droughts, are often not correlated across insured units.  For 
example, if a drought adversely affects one field, it most likely affects neighboring fields as well.  
Systemic risk is the remaining risk that cannot be diversified away.  While private markets 
currently offer products for idiosyncratic risks such as hail or crop fire, up to 50% of the total 
risk in crop production is systemic risk (Zulauf et al., 2013). The scale of the systemic risk issue 
makes establishing a successful private insurance market for multi-peril crop insurance difficult.  
Subsidies therefore help maximize the number of farms to spread the risk across by increasing 
participation in the program. 
Opponents argue that asymmetric information exists between the party who establishes the 
premiums and the producers who purchase the insurance.  In crop insurance markets, 
asymmetric information can lead to a tendency for only high-risk producers to purchase crop 
insurance.  Economists define this scenario as adverse selection.  Previous literature notes the 
cost of crop insurance as the main participation inhibitor of the program in the first five 
decades of its existence.  Adverse selection had a significant impact on the actuarially 
soundness of premium rates for this period (Miranda, 1991).   Low-risk producers avoided 
purchasing crop insurance due to its high cost, only to cause insurance premiums to rise.  The 
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remaining two types of producers who purchased crop insurance were extremely risk-averse 
and high-risk producers.  Insuring high-risk producers kept premiums high, which further 
prevented low-risk producers from enrolling in the program.   
The federal government requires crop insurance participation to be eligible for other federal 
programs and utilizes subsidies to invoke low-risk producers to participate in the program, but 
adverse selection remains.  Makki and Samwaru (2001) find informational asymmetries in the 
crop insurance market lead to federal crop insurance overcharging high-risk producers and 
undercharging low-risk producers for comparable insurance contracts.  Drain tile, irrigation, and 
other unaccounted for growing practices further enhance producers’ ability to distinguish their 
individual risk compared to others.  Crop insurance products that address these different 
growing practices may further reduce adverse selection in crop insurance. 
A lack of desire may also exist among producers to guard themselves against risk once insured 
against its consequences, otherwise referred to as moral hazard.  Hölmstrom (1979) more 
formally defines moral hazard as the situation that arises when individuals engage in risk 
sharing under conditions such that their privately taken actions affect the probability 
distribution of the outcome.  Once producers purchase crop insurance, they may alter their risk 
tolerance in other areas of their operation as a form of risk rebalancing.  A 1996 study by 
Goodwin and Smith finds that Kansas wheat producers who purchase crop insurance use less 
fertilizer and chemicals than those who do not purchase crop insurance.  The premium rates 
generated for these producers are subsequently inefficient once these producers alter their 
production practices.   
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Two alternatives to crop insurance subsidies include diversification of risk through international 
reinsurance markets, or using weather derivatives as primary crop insurance instruments.  
Currently, the United States federal government acts as a reinsurer to companies offering crop 
insurance products to producers.   Due to the size of international reinsurance markets, the 
possibility exists to diversify away systemic risk that exists in domestic crop insurance markets.  
Vedenov and Barnett (2004) analyze the use of weather derivatives as primary crop insurance 
instruments with results that vary widely based on product and region combinations.  
Furthermore, the complexity of the combinations of weather variables impedes the 
commercialization of this proposed solution.   
Crop insurance subsidies remain a highly-debated aspect of the Farm Bill (Zulauf, 2016).  
However, one point of agreement is that government payments can affect farmland values 
(Shoemaker, 1989; Goodwin and Ortalo- Magné, 1992; Veeman et al, 1993; Nickerson et al, 
2012).  The proportion of government payments that producers capitalize into farmland values 
varies depending on the delivery method of the government payment.  Using computable 
general equilibrium modeling, Shoemaker et al (1990) find long-run equilibrium cropland values 
would be 15% to 20% lower in the absence of government payments from farm programs.  
Goodwin and Ortalo-Magné (1992) construct a subsidy equivalent variable for three regions: 
United States, France, and Canada.  They find a 1.0% increase of the subsidy equivalent results 
in a 0.38% increase in farmland values.  Veeman et al (1993) looks at the proposal to remove all 
government subsidies paid directly to producers and finds land values would decrease by an 
average of 19%.  Interestingly, the projected reduction in farmland values varies widely by 
region.  For example, Ontario farmland value projections show a decline of 12.2% while 
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Saskatchewans projected decline was 29.9%.  Alternatively, Langemeier (2013) finds that 
indemnity payments from subsidized yield-protection crop insurance have no significant effect 
on cash rents or land values.   
Economists argue in favor of policies that do not link payments to output or factors of 
production, however these policies are difficult to achieve in practice (Hennessy, 1998).  
Established during the Uruguay Round Reform of 1974, the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
requires agricultural support programs to producers do not influence the type or quantity of 
production (decoupled).  Direct payments to producers is one form of a decoupled agricultural 
program.  In 1996, direct payments replaced previous price support programs and brought US 
agriculture into compliance with WTO rules for agriculture.  Intended only to help producers 
transition to commodity markets driven purely by supply and demand, the 2002 Farm Bill 
solidified the permanence of direct payments with the creation of the Direct and Counter-
cyclical Payment Program (DCP).  DCP remained for a decade until the 2012 Farm Bill, when 
support ceased for direct payments to producers amid an era of historically high farm incomes.   
The lump sum principle from utility maximization theory illustrates why economists favor direct 
payments to producers.  With direct payments, a producer allocates their additional resources 
in a way that maximizes their specific utility.  Because each producer maximizes their utility in a 
different manner, money transferred to producers via direct payments maximizes the sum total 
utility of all producers.   With crop insurance subsidies, producers never explicitly control the 
money that goes towards subsidizing their crop insurance.  They implicitly receive the dollar 
amount of their subsidy via a reduction in premium rates, and the government transfers that 
money directly to crop insurance companies.  If RMA rates crop insurance fairly, the value of 
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the subsidy represents the expected net value to a producer in any given year.  To verify if this 
condition exists, an analysis of the historical loss performance of crop insurance follows.  
2.3 - Loss Ratios 
A common method used to analyze loss performance of crop insurance is to calculate loss 
ratios.  Loss ratios measure the amount of money paid to producers via indemnity payments 
compared to the total premium.  Note, total premium is the sum of producer paid premium and 
government paid premium subsidies.  The Farm Bill requires the Federal Crop Insurance 
Program have a loss ratio objective of not greater than 1.0, or the actuarially fair premium rate.  
A loss ratio greater than one therefore implies the producer received more than the producer 
paid premium plus the subsidy.  Loss ratios in crop insurance tend to vary drastically through 
time, but cluster spatially in any given year, due to the spatial nature of large-scale weather 
phenomena, such as droughts.   
Loss ratios over a period are either average loss ratios (ALR) or total loss ratios (TLR). ALRs are a 
simple average of yearly loss ratios for the period, while TLRs are calculated by dividing the sum 
totals of indemnities and premiums from the entire period.  The different calculations account 
for differences in the scale of the crop insurance program through time.  For example, we can 
consider the same county in the Midwest twenty years apart.  Inflation aside, a loss ratio of 1.5 
in 1995 would not require nearly the size indemnity payout as a loss ratio of 1.5 in 2016.  This 
results from both the participation rate and the average level of coverage increases.   A simple 
average of loss ratios from 1995 through 2016 therefore gives disproportionate weight to 
earlier years when the program was significantly smaller.  Additionally, adverse selection played 
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a greater role in crop insurance prior to subsidy rate increases.  Older loss ratios therefore may 
reflect the difficulty in rating high-risk producers only, and may not be useful in rating insurance 
products today.   
Figures 5 and 6 display ALRs and TLRs, respectively, for the period 1995-2016 in the Midwest.  
Dependent on the loss ratio used, the two pictures illustrate similar loss experiences for some 
counties and vastly different loss experiences for others. For example, both maps show 
Northcentral Illinois on average experienced loss ratios below one for the period, while areas 
such as Northwest Minnesota experienced ALRs greater than one for the period. However, 
counties in Northwest Minnesota paid more in total premium than indemnity payments paid 
out over that period though as illustrated by the TLRs. Analysis of the data shows that crop 
insurance grew drastically over the period of 1995-2016 in Northwest Minnesota, with many 
loss ratios below one occurring later in the period.  
For comparison, Figures 7 – 12 show ALR and TLR for corn, soybeans, and wheat individually.  
Corn, soybeans, and wheat represent the majority of acres insured by federal crop insurance in 
the Midwest.  These maps illustrate that a wide variation in loss experience exists among 
different crops, even within same counties.  Barnard et al (1997) find similar effects from the 
commodity support program payments on cropland values.  Barnard et al find the effects vary 
spatially based on program differences and the agronomic flexibility producers have to grow 
alternative crops.  These effects result in cash rents that are more responsive to government 
payments in certain areas.  
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The ALR and TLR maps reveal often the highest (lowest) loss ratios occur near state borders.  
The observation of high loss ratios near state borders perhaps reflects historical difficulties 
rating crop insurance products using statewide parameters.  Risk characteristics for the entire 
state perhaps do not accurately apply to fringe counties, as arbitrary state lines were often 
established using natural features such as rivers.   
Yearly loss ratio maps for the period 1995-2016 are attached in Appendix A as A1 – A22. These 
maps illustrate how losses are largely regional in any given year. As discussed previously, the 
spatial nature of losses in any given year represents a significant obstacle for private insurance 
companies whose business model relies on the diversification of risk.  A18 displays the effects 
of the drought of 2012 that affected many of the Midwest counties.  Federal crop insurance 
paid out over $13.4 billion in indemnity payments to producers in 2012 alone in the 985 
counties in this analysis.  Conversely, the same 985 counties received just over $1.09 billion in 
indemnity payments in 2016, as displayed in A22.  Table 2 provides a year-by-year reference of 
average premiums, subsidies, and indemnity payments.  
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Table 1: 
 
  
CAT 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85
Basic and Optional Units 100 67 64 64 59 59 55 48 38
Enterprise Units - 80 80 80 80 80 77 68 53
Area Yield Plans - - - - - 59 59 55 55
Area Revenue Plans - - - - - 59 55 55 49
Whole Farm Units - 80 80 80 80 80 80 71 56
Subsidy Rate (%) for Crop Insurance Premiums
Notes: CAT = Catastrophic Insurance, "-" = not applicable
Insurance Plan
--------------------------------------------- Coverage Level (%) -------------------------------------------
Source: RMA
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Table 2: 
  
Average
Standard 
Deviation
Average
Standard 
Deviation
Average
Standard 
Deviation
1995 $10.02 $8.93 $3.93 $3.00 $11.47 $22.27
1996 $13.25 $15.12 $5.02 $4.32 $13.75 $27.98
1997 $12.9 $16.39 $4.79 $4.73 $6.99 $19.67
1998 $13.47 $16.97 $4.96 $5.12 $10.41 $31.33
1999 $13.68 $13.88 $7.25 $7.41 $11.7 $28.06
2000 $13.93 $10.09 $6.41 $5.06 $11.06 $20.63
2001 $15.28 $9.59 $8.56 $5.26 $13.97 $23.33
2002 $15.13 $9.09 $8.44 $5.19 $23.35 $36.59
2003 $17.6 $9.15 $9.8 $5.37 $19 $20.59
2004 $21.9 $8.75 $12.27 $5.12 $18.77 $21.45
2005 $19.89 $6.92 $11.14 $4.06 $10.7 $14.5
2006 $23.1 $9.95 $12.9 $5.68 $12.01 $16.52
2007 $34.82 $11.44 $19.47 $6.5 $19.43 $25.74
2008 $52.61 $12.54 $29.16 $6.88 $53.8 $41.77
2009 $43.09 $11.11 $25.45 $6.6 $17.48 $19.32
2010 $35.77 $11.1 $21.57 $7.07 $19.87 $27.44
2011 $55.66 $15.28 $33.97 $9.88 $39.14 $46.55
2012 $48.9 $12.54 $30.32 $8.63 $105.43 $100.82
2013 $50.32 $12.6 $30.58 $9.1 $49.59 $46.5
2014 $42.41 $13.44 $25.76 $9.56 $35.53 $35.14
2015 $41.28 $14.53 $25.42 $10.42 $25.12 $34.53
2016 $38.65 $18.28 $24.14 $12.99 $8.55 $9.86
Premium/Acre
Indemnity 
Payments/Acre
Subsidy/Acre
Source: RMA SOB
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Table 4: 
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CHAPTER 3 – LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 - Historical Land Value Theory 
There exists a very developed discussion about farmland values and many of those insights 
apply to cash rents paid for farmland. Soil quality, drainage, and proximity to markets 
constitute a few of the factors that affect farmland values and cash rents alike.  Schnitkey and 
Sherrick (2011) explore the relationship between cash rents and farmland values more 
thoroughly, and the two values are highly correlated.  Subsequently, a comprehensive historical 
analysis is warranted. 
Ricardo (1821) established the earliest theory of the value of land.  “Ricardian Rent Theory” 
postulates that rent equals the surplus in production realized on superior soil in comparison to 
production on inferior soils.  In his example, Ricardo imagines a newly settled country with a 
small population.  Figure 13 below illustrates the hypothetical situation. The initial settlers 
begin farming only the highest quality of land, Type A, which yields the largest quantity of 
production, 80.  As the countries’ population grows, increase in demand raises the price to a 
point where farming inferior land, Type B, is economically feasible to cultivate and farm.  
Ricardo determined rent to be the difference in production on Type A land versus Type B.  
Figure 13 illustrates that rent equals 20 units of production.  Furthermore, residents will bring 
additional land into production until the lowest quality land’s marginal revenue equals the 
marginal cost of production.  The land with highest production therefore generates the highest 
rent.    
A German landowner Johann Heinrich von Thünen in the mid-19th century disagreed with 
Ricardo’s theory on how rent is determined.  Assuming all soils are uniform in productivity 
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potential, Von Thunen argued that proximity to market is the most vital determinant of rent.  
Producers produce highly perishable commodities, such as milk and vegetables, on land in the 
immediate vicinity of the market city.  Land use then transitions rapidly to grain production as 
one travels further away from central markets or ports.  Before railroads revolutionized the 
transportation of goods, transportation of agricultural commodities required horses or other 
animals.  Von Thunen drew a major conclusion from the farmer’s dilemma that arose due to the 
highly inefficient modes of transportation.  Highly perishable commodities aside, the further 
away from market a farmer lives, the larger the share of cargo devoted simply to animal feed.  
Hence, the share of cargo consumed is deemed the cost of transportation, and Von Thunen was 
able to derive a formula for calculating rental values:  
𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 ∗ (𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 − 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡) − 𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 ∗ 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 
where FreightRate and Distance costs are smallest on land nearest to markets which equates to 
higher rental rates.  Even in modern markets, cost basis formulas for elevators resemble Von 
Thunen’s calculation above.  Although different, both Ricardo and Von Thunen’s formulas 
represent ways of calculating the profitability of a parcel of land. 
3.2 - Supply and Demand Models 
Ricardo’s farmland price model resembles a supply and demand model, but he never 
introduces scarcity of land into his equation.  Instead, he assumes that when commodity prices 
rise, producers bring an inferior class of soils into production.  Recognizing that the supply of 
farmland was somewhat inelastic and much of the arable land in America was already being 
farmed, researchers in the 1960’s began to analyze farmland values using simultaneous supply 
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and demand models to explain farmland values and cash rent prices.  Herdt and Cochrane 
(1966) link the divergence in trends of farmland prices and farm income to technological 
advances and supply pressure due to urban demand.  Tweeten and Martin’s (1966) five-
equation model finds growing farm sizes and demand for nonfarm land use were the largest 
contributors to land price increases from 1923 to 1966.   Floyd (1965) finds that government 
price-support programs, which restrict supply through either acreage or production limitations, 
result in a windfall gain for everyone in the form of increased land values. These models fit 
historical data quite well, yet Pope et al (1979) finds simultaneous equations hold very little 
predictive power when using current data. 
3.3 - Net Present Value Models 
Economists have used net present value models extensively in the past to value farmland.  The 
present value model: 
 𝑁𝑃𝑉 = ∑
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑡
(1+𝑖)𝑡
− 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑇𝑡=1  
where cash flow represents the return in time t, and i equals the assumed discount rate.   
Farmland as an asset generates income and therefore can be valued as the discounted sum of 
all future residual returns.   In the most basic application, Melichar (1979) uses current returns 
to farmland, expected growth in returns to farmland, and a discount rate in a basic analysis of 
farmland values.  However, Melichar overlooks how both costs and returns fluctuate through 
time, which results in imprecise estimates from the model.  Phipps (1984) uses a Granger 
causality test to confirm the unidirectional relationship between farmland returns and farmland 
prices.  That is, the residual returns to farmland affect the value of farmland, but the value of 
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farmland has no effect on residual returns.  Alston (1986) uses a present value model to 
examine the effects of inflation and real growth in net rental income on farmland prices.  They 
find that “the direct evidence from U.S. data suggests that most of the growth of U.S. farmland 
prices can be accounted for by growth of rental income to land."  
In the mid-1980s, advancements in econometrics allowed researchers to overcome two 
significant problems when trying to use time series analysis: nonstationarity of time series and 
incomplete data on information of market participants.  Shiller (1984) uses these methods to 
analyze NYSE returns, which Falk (1991) replicates using Iowa land values.  Both find 
inconsistencies compared to previous results from net present value models.  Specifically, Falk 
finds that land values tend to overreact to changes in cash rent values; when cash rents rise, 
land values rise by too much, and land values fall by too much when cash rents drop.   
While Falk (1991) argues against present value models, recent literature suggests these models 
still merit some reputability.  Weersink et al (1999) uses a net present value model but includes 
an additional source of income: government payments.  By allowing the discount rate to vary 
for both income sources, they find producers capitalize government payments into land values 
at a much smaller proportion than farm production returns.  They propose uncertainty around 
the longevity of government programs as a potential explanation for this.  Goodwin et al (2004) 
further this research using a present value model to examine how government payments are 
capitalized in to land values differently contingent on the program they are administered 
through.  However, Goodwin et al (2003) questions the results of all previous literature, 
including his own, that uses present value models to evaluate farmland values.  While the 
standard model assumes that land values are determined by long-run expected returns to land, 
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expected returns are inherently unobservable.  Furthermore, even if one fixes expected 
returns, the variation in government payments from year to year induces an identification 
problem unless one assumes individuals accurately predict the variation. 
3.4 - Hedonic Models 
Lancaster (1966) outlines hedonic pricing models in his consumer theory analysis of the 
economics of characteristics.  Early research methods valued farmland based on each parcel’s 
unique characteristics.  However, hedonic pricing model posit farmland prices equal the sum of 
values derived from parcel characteristics.  These characteristics may include soil quality, 
capital improvements, water supply, location to markets, and potential for future development 
(Bastian et al., 2002).  These characteristics are inseparable and contribute to value in 
conjunction with each other.  The heterogeneity across parcels differentiates the hedonic 
model from the classic supply and demand model, which assumes homogeneity of 
characteristics.   
Articles that use hedonic price models to analyze farmland values (Chicoine, 1981; Veeman et 
al., 1993; Stewart & Libby, 1998; Barnard et al., 2001; Henderson & Moore, 2003; among 
others) outnumber those that analyze cash rent paid for farmland.  These classic models may in 
fact do a poor job in their analysis of cash rents.  Where proximity to urban areas and other 
long-term factors greatly affects farmland values, factors that affect potential income, such as 
soil productivity and commodity prices, have greater influence on cash rents (Hanson, 2012).   
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3.5 - Income Approach 
Ricardo defined residual rent as the difference between revenue and costs; however, his 
approach focuses on soils as the main indicator of rents.  The income approach explains rent as 
a function of residual rent, whereas the hedonic approach explains residual rent as a function of 
inherent parcel characteristics (Woodard, 2010).  Featherstone and Baker (1988) derive residual 
rents from actual returns to corn and soybean farms in Tippecanoe County, Indiana from 1960 
through 1985.  For every dollar of residual rent in year t, cash rents increase $0.08 in year t+1 
and $0.60 in the long-run.  Helmers (2004) explains why the inclusion of an inflation factor in 
the calculation of the real interest rate is critical to the derivation of the correct discount factor. 
Helmers finds that without this adjustment to the discount factor, the income approach attains 
a biased valuation of farmland.  
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3.6 - Figure 
 
Figure 13: 
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CHAPTER 4 – MODEL AND DATA 
4.1 – Theoretical Framework 
Supply and demand determines the price paid for any particular parcel of land in the 
marketplace.  When land is homogeneous, supply and demand models apply directly, however, 
land is heterogeneous.  Therefore, this analysis uses a hedonic price model to quantify how the 
quantity and quality of a property’s characteristics determine its price in the market.  Hedonic 
models use a revealed price method to find the price of individual characteristics that 
constitute a good. The hedonic price model below: 
𝑅 = 𝑅(𝑧) 
      𝑧 = (𝑧1, 𝑧2 , … , 𝑧𝑖) 
Where R is cash rent paid in a county, and z is a vector of characteristics that describe that 
county.  A partial derivate of the hedonic function with respect to characteristic 𝑧𝑖, yields the 
price for characteristic  𝑧𝑖: 
𝑝 𝑧𝑖( 𝑧𝑖) =  
𝜕𝑅
𝜕 𝑧𝑖
 
Note, the marginal price function of  𝑧𝑖 does not have to be a constant.   
Because of the vast amount of quality real estate data available, most literature using spatial 
hedonic fixed effect models focuses on the real estate sector.  These models reduce 
misspecification that is present due to omitted, time‐invariant explanatory variables (Osland, 
2013).  More specifically, Can and Megbolugbe (1997) find that spatial hedonic fixed effects 
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models reduce the extent of the prediction error, remove most of the systematic error, and 
produce better predictors of housing prices.   
Spatial Autocorrelation 
The First Law of Geography states: “Everything is related to everything else, but closer things 
more so” (Tobler, 1979).  The concept Tobler references is spatial autocorrelation.  Spatial 
autocorrelation, otherwise known as spatial dependence, is defined as the correlation between 
the distribution of a variable and its location (Anselin & Bera, 1998).  Previous research focused 
on farmland valuation and farmland rental prices finds spatial correlation (Anselin, 1992; Du et 
al., 2007; Du et al., 2008; Huang et al., 2006; Soto, 2004).   
Spatial autocorrelation and temporal autocorrelation are similar.  However, temporal 
autocorrelation relates directionally one way, as events in period t+1 cannot affect period t.  
Spatial autocorrelation relates in any proximity direction as different regions affect each other, 
therefore requiring an entirely different framework to account for spatial relationships.   
Formally, if 𝑦𝑖 and 𝑦𝑗 are realizations of a random variable 𝑦, indexed by spatial locations, then 
we have spatial autocorrelation if: 
   𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑦𝑖𝑡, 𝑦𝑗𝑡) = 𝐸(𝑦𝑖𝑡, 𝑦𝑗𝑡) − 𝐸(𝑦𝑖𝑡)𝐸(𝑦𝑗𝑡) ≠ 0    
where i and j are individual counties at time t, and 𝑦𝑖𝑡 and 𝑦𝑗𝑡 are corresponding random 
variables.   
Spatial autocorrelation can be both positive and negative, although negative autocorrelation is 
rare.  Positive spatial autocorrelation implies the values of geographical neighbors tend to move 
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together simultaneously.  If present, spatial autocorrelation indicates the probability of a value 
taken on by any of the model’s error term entries might affect the probability of a value taken 
on by one of the remaining error term entries.  Failure to account for this relationship in the 
model violates the assumption of randomly distributed error terms.   
Griffith (1987) ascertains the need for a measurement of spatial autocorrelation to index the 
nature and degree to which the data violate the fundamental statistical assumption, and 
describe the overall pattern across a geographic landscape.  Moran (1950) developed the most 
commonly used measurement of spatial autocorrelation known as the Moran’s-I test.  The 
Moran’s-I statistic for spatial autocorrelation is: 
𝐼 =  
𝑁
∑𝑖𝑡∑𝑗𝑡𝑊
∗
∑𝑖𝑡∑𝑗𝑡𝑊(𝑌𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?)(𝑌𝑗𝑡 − ?̅?) 
∑𝑖𝑡(𝑌𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?)
 
where N is the number of spatial units indexed by i and j, Y is the dependent variable, t is the 
index of time, and W is a weight matrix defining the relationship between observations.  
Moran’s-I values range -1<I<1, where positive values indicate clustering, and negative values 
indicate dispersion.  The null hypothesis is that there is no spatial autocorrelation, and the 
Moran’s statistic is asymptotically standard normal, so is interpreted in the same way as a p-
value (Viton, 2010).The greater in absolute value the Moran’s-I value is, the stronger indication 
there is of spatial relationships in the data.   
An equivalent of Moran’s-I for panel data has yet to be developed for broad analysis.  Baltagi et 
al (2003) propose lagrange multiplier (LM) tests to verify the presence of random effects and 
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serial or cross-sectional correlation in panel data models.  This analysis uses joint, marginal and 
conditional tests for all combinations of random effects and spatial correlation.   
First, the joint hypothesis (Joint LM) of no spatial or serial error correlation and no random 
region effects is tested.  The marginal LM test1 (𝐿𝑀1) for spatial error correlation assuming no 
serial correlation or random region effects is then used.  Similarly, a marginal LM test for no 
serial correlation (𝐿𝑀2)  assuming no spatial error correlation or random region effects is used.  
Finally, one-dimensional conditional tests are used.  The first (𝐿𝑀λ) tests for no serial 
correlation assume the presence of spatial error correlation and random region effects.  
Likewise, the second (𝐿𝑀𝜎) tests for zero random region effects assuming the presence of both 
serial and spatial error correlation.   
Table 5 below presents the null and alternative hypotheses, along with results.  P-values near 
zero for all tests reveal the presence of serial correlation, spatial error correlation, and random 
regional effects.  This discovery reveals the use of a spatial model is required to ensure 
obtained estimators are efficient.   
Weight Matrix 
A spatial weight matrix W is defined as the formal expression of spatial relationships among 
observations (Anselin & Bera, 1998).  The weight matrix is an NxN positive matrix in which the 
rows and columns correspond to the cross-sectional observations (Anselin et al., 2008).  Weight 
matrices vary in their structure and format.  The most basic weight matrix is a binary matrix 
where a value of 1 represents a neighbor, with 0 for everyone else.  The diagonals each equal 0 
                                                          
1 This is the original marginal LM test developed by Anselin (1988). 
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as well, as units cannot be neighbors with themselves.  One feature of neighbors is that they do 
not vary over time.  Unless the weights are based on a formal theoretical model for social or 
spatial interaction, their specifications are often ad hoc (Anselin et al., 2008). 
This study uses a great circle distance weight matrix at the smallest distance possible while 
simultaneously not creating “island” counties that have no neighbors.  No known previous 
literature models information flow between counties about cash rental values and other 
agricultural information, but the general consensus is that information flow does exist.  For 
example, a producer will not pay two vastly different rental rates for a uniform parcel of 
farmland divided in half by an arbitrary county border, ceteris peribus.   
Spatial software such as Geoda expedites the neighbor identification process.  In the data used 
in this analysis, Geoda identifies 90 kilometers as the minimum distance that creates zero island 
counties.  The resulting weight matrix takes the form: 
 𝑤𝑖𝑗
∗ = {
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 = 𝑗
1 𝑑𝑖𝑗
2⁄  𝑖𝑓 𝑑𝑖𝑗 ≤ 90   
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑑𝑖𝑗 > 90
 
    and 
 W = 𝑤𝑖𝑗
∗ ∑𝑤𝑖𝑗
∗
𝑗
⁄    
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Where 𝑤𝑖𝑗
∗  is an element of the unstandardized weight matrix, 𝑤𝑖𝑗 is an element of the row-
standardized weight matrix W, and 𝑑𝑖𝑗 is the great circle distance between centroids of region i 
and j.2 
The weight matrix W must be row standardized due to the variation in number of neighbors by 
county.  Row standardization subjects each county to the same total spatial influence from 
surrounding counties, regardless of the number of neighbors they have.  The process of row 
standardization involves dividing each neighbor weight for a specific feature by the sum of all 
neighbor weights for that feature.  Each row standardized weight can then be interpreted as 
the fraction of all spatial influence on 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦𝑖  attributable to 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦𝑗 .  The resulting weight 
matrix W applies not only to cross-sectional data, but to panel data as well, given the spatial 
attributes remain constant through time.  Using the subscript to designate the matrix 
dimension, with W𝑁 as the weights for the cross-sectional dimension, the full NT ×NT weights 
matrix then becomes:  
𝑊 = 𝐼𝑇 ⊗𝑊𝑁  
with N as the number of observations in the cross-sectional matrix, T as the number of periods, 
and 𝐼𝑇 as an identity matrix of dimension T (Anselin et al., 2008). 
While time series analysis uses time lag operators to incorporate information about neighbor 
observations, spatial panel models use spatial lags.  The need for spatial lags arises from the 
irregular nature of spatial relationships in which the number of neighbors may vary drastically 
across a dataset.  In essence, a spatial lag operator constructs a new variable that consists of 
                                                          
2 No time dimension t is included as the weight matrix W is constant through time. 
40 
 
the weighted average of the neighboring observations, with the weights as specified in W 
(Anselin et al., 2008).  Spatial lags therefore can be applied to the dependent variable, the 
independent variables, or the error term to control for spatial relationships.   
Spatial Hausman Test 
Previous literature progressed from supply and demand models, to net present value models, 
to hedonic models most recently.  These models do not explicitly account for the relationships 
that exist when neighboring counties affect each other’s rents.  Therefore, a spatial model is 
required to account for these relationships.  Spatial panel data offers the ability to isolate 
specific effects that may be due to spatial or temporal attributes.   
As with classic panel regression models, spatial panel models are either random or fixed.  A 
spatial Hausman test is employed to determine whether a random or fixed effect estimator 
should be used.  This test determines between two estimators differing in efficiency.  The 
alternative hypothesis of the spatial Hausman test finds misspecification the two estimators 
yield divergent results (Pace, 2008).  The Hausman test statistic takes the form 
𝐻 = 𝑁𝑇(𝜃𝐹𝐺𝐿𝑆 − 𝜃𝑊)
𝑇(Σ̂𝑊 − Σ̂𝐹𝐺𝐿𝑆)
−1(𝜃𝐹𝐺𝐿𝑆 − 𝜃𝑊) 
where 𝜃𝐹𝐺𝐿𝑆  and 𝜃𝑊 are, respectively, the spatial GLS and within estimators, and Σ̂𝑊 and Σ̂𝐹𝐺𝐿𝑆 
the corresponding estimates of the coefficients’ variance covariance matrices.  H is 
asymptotically distributed 𝑋2 with k degrees of freedom where k is the number of regressors in 
the model (Millo & Piras, 2012).  
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In the case of this analysis, the spatial Hausman test determines whether the data support a 
random or fixed effects model.   
𝐻0: 𝑋
2 ≥ 0.05 
𝐻𝑎:  𝑋
2 < 0.05 
where an insignificant p-value implies the random effects model is safe to use.  Table 6 below 
displays the 𝑋2 statistics from the spatial Hausman tests on the different regressions.  Each 
regression returns a statistically significant p-value, allowing us to reject the null hypothesis in 
favor of the spatial fixed effects model. 
4.2 – Spatial Autoregressive Fixed Effect Model 
Spatial lag and spatial error models are the two most commonly used spatial-temporal models.  
Three different types of spatial interaction effects can be distinguished in these models: 
endogenous interaction effects among the dependent variable, exogenous interaction effects 
among the independent variables over space, and interaction effects among the error terms 
over space (Elhorst, 2011).  Spatial error models control for interaction effects among the error 
terms over space, while spatial lag models control for the other two.  When there are no strong 
a priori theoretical reasons to believe that interdependences between spatial units arises either 
due to the spatial lags of the dependent variables or due to spatially autoregressive error terms, 
the standard approach is to model the system with both effects included (Anselin, 2002).  The 
spatial autoregressive (SARAR) fixed effect model combines the two models and controls for 
interaction effects among the error terms over space and endogenous interaction effects 
among the dependent variable. 
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First, consider a general static panel model that includes a spatial lag of the dependent variable 
and spatial autoregressive disturbances: 
𝑦 = λ(𝐼𝑇⊗W)𝑦 +  𝑋𝛽 +  𝑢 
where 𝑦 is an NT x 1 vector of observations on the dependent variable, X is a NT x k matrix of 
observations on the non-stochastic exogenous regressors, 𝐼𝑇 an identity matrix of dimension 
T, W is the NT x NT spatial weights matrix of known constants whose diagonal elements are set 
to zero, and λ the corresponding spatial parameter.  The disturbance vector u is the sum of two 
terms 
𝑢 = (ι𝑇 ⊗ 𝐼𝑁)𝜇 + 𝜀 
where ι𝑇  is a T × 1 vector of ones, 𝐼𝑁 an N x N identity matrix, 𝜇 is a vector of time invariant 
individual specific effects (not spatially autocorrelated), and 𝜀 a vector of spatially 
autocorrelated innovations.  To further allow innovations to be correlated over time, the 
innovations vector follows an error component structure  
𝜀 =  (ι𝑇 ⊗ 𝐼𝑁)𝜇 + 𝑣 
where 𝜌 is the corresponding spatial autoregressive parameter, 𝜇 is the vector of cross-
sectional specific effects, 𝑣 a vector of innovations that vary both over cross-sectional units and 
time periods, ι𝑇  is a vector of ones and 𝐼𝑁 an N × N identity matrix 
As in the classical panel data literature, the individual effects can be treated as fixed or random.  
Fixed effect models control for all time-invariant latent variables that influence the dependent 
variable, whether these variables are known or unknown.  The spatial Hausman test applied to 
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the models in this analysis determined the spatial fixed effect model provided the most 
efficient estimates. 
A SARAR fixed effects model can be written in stacked form as  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  λ(𝐼𝑇⊗W)𝑦𝑖𝑡 + (ι𝑇 ⊗ 𝐼𝑁)𝜇𝑖𝑡 +  𝑋𝛽 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
The presence of the spatial lag introduces a form of endogeneity that violates the assumption 
of standard regression models (i.e., the regressors are uncorrelated with the error term).  
Elhorst (2003) transforms the variables in the equation above by eliminating the time invariant 
individual effects and uses the transformed variables to maximize the likelihood function.  The 
transformation is obtained by subtracting the average for each cross-section over time.  As a 
consequence, the fixed effects and the constant term (as well as other variables that do not 
vary over time) are wiped out from the model.  The error term estimation strategy from the 
cross-sectional spatial error model is then extended to the panel context. 
𝑢𝑖𝑡 = 𝜌(I𝑇 ⊗W)𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀 
The resulting model of cash rents for county i at time t is: 
         𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 =  𝜌𝑊(𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑡 +
                                   𝛽3𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑆𝑜𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝑧𝑡 + 𝑠𝑖  
where 𝜌𝑊(𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡) is a spatial lag of the dependent variable in county i at time t, 
𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the one, three, and five year lagged moving averages of net value from crop 
insurance in county i at time t, 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the revenue expected from one 
acre of production of corn in county i at time t, 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑆𝑜𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the expected 
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revenue from one acre of production of soybeans in county i at time t, 𝑧𝑡 is a 1 x T matrix of the 
year fixed effect estimates, and 𝑠𝑖 is a 1 x N matrix of the county fixed effect estimates.  
Figure 14 below displays the map of the county fixed effect estimates.  The county fixed effects 
matrix 𝑠𝑖 can be treated as a dependent variable in a cross-sectional regression to determine 
the impacts that time invariant variables have on cash rents.  As figure 14 shows, spatial 
relationships exist among the county fixed effect estimates. To account for these relationships, 
a cross-sectional version of the previously defined SARAR model is used. The resulting cross-
sectional model is: 
              𝐹𝐸𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑖 =  𝜌𝑊(𝐹𝐸𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑖) + 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑆𝑡𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖 +
                                          𝛽3𝑆𝑜𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑆𝑡𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐺𝐷𝐷𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡  
where 𝜌𝑊(𝐹𝐸𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑖) is a spatial lag of the fixed effect estimates, 𝑆𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑖 is a productivity 
measure of soils in county i, 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑆𝑡𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖  is the standard deviation of detrended corn yields in 
county i, 𝑆𝑜𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑆𝑡𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖  is the standard deviation of detrended soybean yields in county i, 
𝐺𝐷𝐷𝑖  is the average GDDs in county i, and 𝑢𝑖  is the previously defined SARAR error term that 
controls for spatial error autocorrelation.  
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4.3 – Data 
Cash rent paid for non-irrigated land is the dependent variable used in this thesis.  The National 
Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) conducts hundreds of surveys annually, one of which 
collects data on cash rent paid for non-irrigated land.  NASS compiles these data using surveys 
administered on farms and ranches that rent land on a cash basis.  Excluded from the cash rent 
value is land rented for a share of the crop, rent determined by animal production, land rented 
free of charge, or land that includes buildings such as barns. 
NASS records provide panel data of cash rental values for the period 2008-2016.  Panel data are 
ideal for this study, as Elhorst (2011) states panel data are generally more informative and 
contain more variation and less collinearity among the variables.  A regulation change in 2014 
required NASS to survey producers about land values on a biannual basis, which created a gap 
in the data between 2014 and 2016.3  
One limitation in the analysis arises from an unbalanced panel due to incomplete data.  Due to 
the spatial nature of the question examined in this thesis, analysis of only counties with a 
complete eight-year rent data results in an “island” problem.  Islands occur in spatial models 
when individuals possess zero neighbors.  Some spatial computational routines cannot be 
completed when islands exist in the data, and most econometricians consider it best practice to 
avoid islands in spatial models.  To circumvent this error, spatially interpolated values are used 
in lieu of missing values to create an artificially balanced panel data set.  Table 7 below breaks 
                                                          
3. For comparison in the analysis, 2015 rental values are imputed using a simple average of 2014 and 2016 
rental values. Small differences exist in coefficient magnitudes when comparing regression results that 
include and exclude the 2015 imputed cash rents. 
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out imputed missing values by state.  LeSage and Pace (2004) suggest replacing the unobserved 
data with expected values conditional on the observed data. The spatial interpolation used the 
simple average of the five nearest neighbor counties in that year to complete the dataset.4  This 
represents a simplified method of kriging, which is an optimal linear prediction method applied 
to random processes in space.   
After missing values were imputed, complete data existed for 985 of the 1,017 counties in the 
Midwest.  Figure 16 below displays cash rent values for those 985 counties in 2016.  Highest 
rent values are located in the counties in southern Minnesota through Iowa and into central 
Illinois.  Figure 17 below displays a map of detrended yields of corn, which bears a strong 
resemblance to the graph of cash rent.  One could argue in favor of Ricardo’s cash rent theory 
based on these two graphs alone.   
An additional concern relates to the construction of the aggregated data set employed in this 
analysis.  Spatial analyses often use arbitrary regions such as census tracts or counties. 
Statistical literature often criticizes this method as yielding invalid inference, the so-called 
ecological fallacy problem (Anselin, 2003).  Broadly, the ecological fallacy problem refers to the 
inconsistency that arises from micro-interpretations based off macro-analysis. In the context of 
this analysis, data are aggregated based off arbitrary county lines and results are then 
interpreted as producer-level. Different aggregation methods applied to data help determine 
the sensitivity of the results to the ecological fallacy problem. This is impractical in the case of 
                                                          
4 Boehmke and Schilling (2015) recommend the Expectation Maximization (EM) approach to address the missing 
data problem in spatial panel models. That approach applied to this analysis produced inconsistent and illogical 
rent values, which resulted in inefficient estimators.  
47 
 
this analysis though as data on multiple variables were collected in an aggregated form. 
Therefore, this thesis interprets macro-analysis results as producer-level with caution. 
Explanatory Variables 
The variable of interest in this thesis is the net value of crop insurance to the producer on a per 
acre basis.  The net value of crop insurance variable is calculated as 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒/𝐴𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 =
(𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡)
𝐴𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡
 
where each net value per acre equals the ratio in each county i at time t, of indemnity plus 
subsidy minus premium, all divided by acres.  RMA’s Summary of Business data contain county 
level crop insurance premiums, indemnities, and subsidies from the 1980’s to current.  This 
analysis only references RMA Summary of Business data from 1995 through 2016, as premium 
rating, products offered, and subsidy rates changed drastically after the 1994 Act.  As illustrated 
by Figure 15 and the yearly net value maps in Appendix B, net values vary widely across space 
and time, but also cluster spatially.  Analysis of this variation reveals the effect of net value of 
crop insurance on rental values.   
Previous agricultural land value literature uses a plethora of different variables in hedonic price 
models (Palmquist & Danielson, 1989; Chicoine, 1989; Drescher et al., 2001; Bastian et al., 
2002; Patton & McErlean, 2003; Huang et al, 2006; Guiling et al., 2007; Baylis et al., 2011).  This 
thesis includes several of these variables for analysis and comparison against previous 
literature.  These variables are classified as either time variant or time invariant.  As previously 
discussed, the fixed effect models by design cannot include time invariant variables.  The time 
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invariant variables included in this analysis are used in robustness checks with random effects 
models and in cross-sectional regressions.  
Time Variant Variables 
Farmland values are established by an array of factors, both related to production of farm 
commodities and not. However, producers establish cash rents for farmland mainly off factors 
that influence income expectations. To control for income expectations, expected revenue from 
corn and soybeans are calculated from trend yields and crop insurance harvest prices from the 
prior growing season.  Crop insurance harvest prices provide the best commodity price 
estimate for expected revenues the following year given cash rents are often negotiated in the 
fall (Woodard, 2012).  Expected revenue therefore equals the harvest price multiplied times the 
trend yield for both corn and soybeans.  
Time Invariant Variables 
Soil productivity is widely recognized as an important driver of rental values.  Soil productivity 
measures how soil profiles either promote or impede yield potential.  States in the Midwest 
often use indexes unique to individual states, with no conventional conversion method to 
standardize across space.  For example, Illinois uses a Productivity Index where values range 
from 47 to 147, while Iowa uses a Corn Suitability Index that ranges from 0 to 100.  While both 
score on a 100-point scale, soil attributes are valued differently in each case.  However, the 
Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) derived the National Commodity Crop 
Productivity Index (NCCPI), which is a county level measure of soil productivity.  The NCCPI 
values the natural relationships of soil, landscape, and climate factors, and the responsiveness 
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of commodity crops to those factors on a 0 to 1 scale.  For the purpose of this study, the NCCPI 
remains static through time, although literature suggests erosion affects soil productivity 
through time (Williams et al., 1983) 
Trend yields provide an expected production value for any given county, which affects expected 
revenue, but the variance of that yield is also an important consideration.  Barry et al (2000) 
show cash rental rates include a risk premium based upon the historical variance of yields.  
Under cash rent arrangements, producers bear 100% of the yield risk, versus sharecropping 
arrangements, where yield risk is divided proportionally between landlord and producer.  This 
thesis employs a standard deviation of yield to control for the effect of yield variance on cash 
rental rates.   
Detrended yields are used to calculate standard deviations for corn and soybeans.  Detrended 
yield values are used to account for the increase in yields through time for corn and soybeans.  
Uncorrected yield data results in an average yield that is biased downwards and standard 
deviation of yield that is biased upwards.  The detrended yield calculation for each county i at 
time t is: 
𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖 ∗ (2016 − 𝑡) 
where 𝛽𝑖 is the slope coefficient of yields for county i for the period 1980 through 2016, and t is 
the corresponding year of the yield value. 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖 is a simple average of detrended 
yield values for county i. We calculate standard deviation of detrended yields 𝜎𝑖 with the 
detrended yield values.  
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Weather is another important factor in crop production and therefore impacts cash rents. 
Weather is the day-to-day variability of solar radiation, air temperature, humidity, and 
precipitation across the landscape (Hollinger, 2009).  These are all key atmospheric variables 
that affect crop yields.  Climate is the long-term average of these variables over a crop’s 
growing season.  In the absence of weather extremes, climate determines the realized yields for 
any given county.  To control for the effect of different climate patterns on cash rents in the 
Midwest, this analysis uses a measurement of heat units.   
Physiologically, below or above certain temperatures, crops cease growth development.  To 
quantify the amount of heat available to crops, a measure of heat units, growing degree days 
(GDDs), is used.  Using county level PRISM weather data, GDDs are calculated as 
𝐺𝐷𝐷𝑠 =∑
(𝑇𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑇min )
2
− 𝑇base  
where 𝑇𝑚𝑎𝑥 is the daily maximum air temperature, 𝑇𝑚𝑖𝑛 is the daily minimum air temperature,  
𝑇𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒 is the temperature below which crop growth ceases, and the daily GDDs are constrained 
to greater than or equal to zero.  While base temperatures vary by crop (Yang et al., 1995), the 
most common base temperature used in GDD calculations, and by this analysis, is 50℉.  GDDs 
in this analysis are the county average from 2008-2016. 
Table 9 below displays the relationships among all variables.  High collinearity exists among 
many of the variables, especially the net values of crop insurance, which complicates the 
interpretation of this table.  However, interesting insights are garnered from the net value 
correlations.  First, the correlation between rent and the smaller net values ranges from none 
to very weak.  This result occurs due to the spatial variation of large net value payments in the 
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short run.  A weak negative correlation emerges though as net values are averaged over a 
longer period.  Second, each net value variable is strongly correlated with the others, other 
than the one-year net value.   The one-year net value exhibits only a moderate correlation with 
other net value variables, implying net values from one year of data are only slightly related to 
long-term averages.   
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4.4 – Tables and Figures 
Table 5: 
 
 
Number of Years 
of Average 
Previous Net Value
1 Year 3 Year 5 Year
37,052 37,183 37,227
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
127.91 127.42 127.54
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
143.85 144.73 144.78
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
67.68 67.85 68.18
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
126.89 126.41 126.52
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Lagrange Multiplier Tests for Random Effects and Spatial Autocorrelation
p-values in parentheses
𝐻0 :       = 𝜎 
2 = 0
𝐻𝑎 :       = 𝜎 
2 ≠ 0
𝐻0 :   = 0 (assuming  = 𝜎 
2 = 0)
𝐻𝑎 :   ≠ 0 (assuming  = 𝜎 
2 = 0)
𝐻0 : 𝜎 
2 = 0 (assuming  =  = 0)
𝐻𝑎 : 𝜎 
2 ≠ 0 (assuming  =  = 0)
𝐻0 :  𝜎 = 0 (assuming  =  ≠ 0)
   
𝐻𝑎 :  𝜎 ≠ 0 (assuming  =  ≠ 0)
   
𝐻0 :   = 0 (assuming 𝜎 
2 =  ≠ 0)
𝐻𝑎 :   ≠ 0 (assuming 𝜎 
2 =  ≠ 0)
   
   
JointLM
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Table 6: 
Hausman Test for Spatial Models 
 
Number of Years of 
Average Previous Net 
Value 
Chi-Squared p-value 
 
 
1 Year 243.32 0.00 
 
 
3 Year 266.14 0.00 
 
 
5 Year 313.3 0.00 
 
 
 
Table 7: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Potential NASS Total Missing Values % missing
All 985 Counties 8865 8013 852 9.61%
Illinois 873 819 54 6.19%
Indiana 828 726 102 12.32%
Iowa 891 889 2 0.22%
Kansas 837 743 94 11.23%
Michigan 621 491 130 20.93%
Minnesota 747 708 39 5.22%
Missouri 900 784 116 12.89%
Nebraska 684 597 87 12.72%
North Dakota 477 469 8 1.68%
Ohio 774 681 93 12.02%
South Dakota 594 542 52 8.75%
Wisconsin 630 564 66 10.48%
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Figure 14: 
 
Figure 15: 
 
55 
 
Figure 16: 
 
Figure 17: 
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Table 8: 
Variable Mean StDev Min Max 
RENT 112.98 66.16 7.9 385 
1 YEAR NV 22.62 54.43 -45.13 705.37 
3 YEAR NV 18.06 29.58 -39.34 360.96 
5 YEAR NV 16.15 22.17 -30.48 282.28 
EXPECTED CORN 
REVENUE 
684.87 272.67 165.53 1585.22 
EXPECTED SOY 
REVENUE 
462.31 184.45 145.58 2293.11 
GDD 3139.3 707.9 1557.9 5012.7 
SOIL 0.505 0.178 0.114 0.912 
CORN YIELD AVE 148.28 40.86 43.22 220.07 
CORN YIELD 
STDEV 
19.17 6.98 7.49 49.15 
SOY YIELD AVE 43.15 14.71 15.79 70.52 
SOY YIELD STDEV 5.48 2.19 1.75 12.58 
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CHAPTER 5 - RESULTS 
Table 10 below displays results from the SARAR fixed effects model.  Cash rent in each county is 
the dependent variable against which all independent variables are regressed.  Results confirm 
expected coefficient signs for all statistically significant variables.  Analogous to Ifft, Wu, and 
Kuethe’s (2014) results, the consistency of net value that producers receive influences both the 
coefficient magnitude and significance level.  
The results in this analysis are interpreted with caution. The endogeneity remaining in the 
model and the ecological fallacy problem, which warns against the interpretation of aggregate 
data at the producer level, complicate the interpretation of results. Because producers 
determine cash rents and crop insurance coverage in a joint evaluation with other production 
decisions, even using a spatial panel fixed effect model likely does not eliminate all 
endogeneity.   
Table 10 shows there is strong evidence that crop insurance affects cash rents.  As the moving 
averages over which net value is calculated increase in length, the coefficients both grow and 
migrate from statistical insignificance to statistical significance. The one-year lag and three-year 
lag of net value are positive but statistically insignificant, while net value is statistically 
significant at the 95% confidence level for the five-year lagged average of net value.   
Interpreting the coefficients of net value, the consistency of receiving net value from crop 
insurance has a significant impact on the degree to which producers factor the net value into 
cash rents.  The one-year and three-year lagged averages of net value reveals that producers 
who receive consistent net value from crop insurance over a period of one to three years do 
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not factor a statistically significant amount of net value into cash rents.  However, as the 
consistency of net value increases, producers do factor a statistically significant proportion into 
cash rents.  A producer who receives one dollar of net value from crop insurance consistently 
for five years factors 0.96 cents directly into cash rents, after all other adjustments.   
These results agree with Langemeier (2013). However, they contrast previous analysis of 
government payments to producers.  Van Herck et al. (2013) found that producers factor up to 
$0.25 of each additional dollar of direct payments from the government into cash rents.  The 
results from this thesis indicate that producers only factor $0.01 of every dollar of net value 
from crop insurance into cash rents.  
One concern with the interpretation of the net value coefficients is that some counties 
consistently experienced negative net values of crop insurance. Figure 15 shows the five-year 
lagged average of net values in 2016, and multiplying the coefficients found in the regressions 
below times the five-year lagged average of net value, we find that, ceteris peribus, some 
counties paid less for cash rents due to crop insurance. However, this interpretation is illogical. 
Counties supposedly paying less for cash rents feasibly stems from endogeneity that remains in 
the model. 
Additionally, the economic significance of the net value results is difficult to directly assess.  The 
average rent in 2016 for the 985 counties in this analysis was $112.98.  Using the largest five-
year average net value of $282.28, cash rents were only $2.70 higher per acre due to crop 
insurance in that county.  The $16.15 average five-year lagged average of net value equates to 
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cash rents per acre that are higher by $0.16 due to crop insurance. For comparison, the 2016 
crop insurance base price for corn was $3.86 per bushel. 
Coefficients for expected revenue from corn were both positive and statistically significant at 
the 99.9% confidence level, regardless of the length over which net value was calculated.  This 
affirms income as a significant factor considered when producers and farmland owners 
negotiate cash rents.  While not directly comparable, producers factor a larger proportion of 
expected corn revenue into cash rents in comparison to the five-year lagged average of net 
value. However, these variables are difficult to disentangle, as producers perhaps factor net 
value from crop insurance into expected revenue from corn. 
Expected revenue from soybeans was positive as well, but statistically insignificant.  This 
potentially results from the strong degree of correlation between expected revenue from corn 
and soybeans confounding the results. Table 9 shows a correlation coefficient of 0.81 between 
these variables.  The additional results tables (Tables 13-18), most often, either expected 
revenue from corn or expected revenue from soybeans has a statistically significant impact on 
cash rents, but rarely both.  
Table 10 also contains the spatial coefficients from each regression.  The spatial error 
coefficients reflect the latent spatial dependence in the data. These coefficients measure the 
average influence on observations by their neighboring observations.  The positive and highly 
significant spatial lag coefficients signify that cash rents of each county positively influence cash 
rents in neighboring counties. Practically, cash rents paid for farmland near county borders are 
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highly influenced by cash rents paid for nearby farmland, regardless of which county that 
farmland is located within.  
Table 11 displays the marginal effects from each regression.  Direct effects are the average 
effect of changes to an explanatory variable in 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦𝑖  on cash rent values in each of 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦𝑖’s 
neighbors. For example, if the average five-year net value of crop insurance increased by $1.00 
in 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦𝑖, cash rents in 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦𝑖’s neighbors, on average, would increase $0.018. Conversely, 
indirect effects are the average impact on cash rents in 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦𝑖  if all values for an explanatory 
variable increased by one in each of 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦𝑖 ’s neighbors. Therefore, an increase of net value by 
$1.00 in each of 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦𝑖 ’s neighbors would raise cash rents in 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦𝑖  by $0.083.   
Similar to the point estimate coefficients, the only statistically significant marginal effects for 
net value are those averaged over five years. Marginal effects for expected corn revenue are 
each statistically significant while none are for expected soybean revenue. The magnitude of 
the indirect effects tends to be larger than the magnitude of the direct effects. This indicates 
cash rent increases in 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦𝑖 ’s neighbor counties due to consistent net value has a larger 
effect than the effect on 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦𝑖’s  neighbors if 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦𝑖  experienced an additional dollar in 
consistent net value. 
The remaining independent variables are time invariant and so can only be regressed against 
the fixed effect estimates from the SARAR fixed effect model.  Table 12 displays the results 
from these cross-sectional regressions below.  Soil has a positive and statistically significant 
impact on cash rents in each regression.  Producers therefore pay significantly higher cash rents 
for soils with higher productivity indexes. Standard deviation of yield for corn is insignificant, 
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but for soybeans was statistically significant and negative.  This affirms that producers 
significantly discount farmland where soybean yields are riskier because they bear all risk in a 
cash rental agreement.   
To measure the effect of weather, average growing degree days (GDDs) is included in the time 
invariant variables, as long term weather patterns are most often assumed when rents are 
established. The results found GDDs have a statistically significant and negative impact on cash 
rents. This reflects the fact that excessive or minimal amounts of GDDs can harm plant growth, 
which results in lower yields, and is therefore factored into rents.  
For robustness checks, a SARAR random effects model and non-spatial panel model are applied 
to the data in this analysis. Tables 13 and 14 report the results from the robustness checks. Net 
value coefficients in each of the three regions follow a familiar pattern to results from the 
SARAR panel fixed effects model. 
Consistency of net value again determines the magnitude and statistical significance of 
coefficients.  In both the SARAR fixed and random effects models, only the five-year average 
was statistically significant, reaffirming the length over which net value is measured is an 
important factor to consider. In the SARAR random effects model, the net value coefficients are 
very similar to the SARAR fixed effect model.  The five-year net value coefficient was 0.0096 in 
the SARAR fixed effect model compared to 0.0101 in the SARAR random effects model.   
The non-spatial fixed effects model found net value coefficients significantly larger in 
magnitude though. The three and five-year moving averages of net value were both statistically 
significant and 0.1155 and 0.3325, respectively. This represents a significant increase in 
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magnitude in comparison to the SARAR fixed effects model. Not accounting for spatial 
relationships in the data would therefore results in a vastly different conclusion in this analysis. 
Again, these models are inefficient in comparison to the SARAR fixed effects model, as the LM 
and Spatial Hausman tests found, and are only reported for comparison.  
Because producer experiences with crop insurance are highly related within regions, additional 
robustness checks are included in this analysis. First, a SARAR fixed effect model is used to 
analyze the three ERS regions in this analysis (Corn Belt, Lake States, and Northern Plains) 
separately. Additionally, because the data for Iowa are nearly 100% complete, an additional 
SARAR fixed effect model is used on Iowa alone as a robustness check.  
Tables 15-17 report the results from the regional regressions below.  The results from the 
Northern Plains closely resemble the results from all 985 counties.  Expected corn revenue has 
a positive and statistically significant effect on cash rents while expected soybean revenue does 
not.  Net value also has a positive and statistically significant impact on cash rents, but only 
when a five-year moving average is used.  The magnitude of the five-year net value coefficient 
is 0.0298, which is slightly larger than the results from the complete sample.  
Similar to the results from the Northern Plains regressions, the coefficients for expected 
revenue in the Lake States from corn were positive and statistically significant for corn, but 
statistically insignificant with mixed signs for soybeans.  Net value was negative in the one-year 
moving average, but statistically insignificant.  This result may reflect the volatility in payments 
from year to year.  The three and five-year net values were statistically significant and 
comparable in magnitude to the five-year coefficient from the Northern Plains.  
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The results from the Corn Belt regressions find that expected revenue from both corn and 
soybeans has a positive and statistically significant impact on cash rents.  The net value 
coefficients are positive, but statistically insignificant in each regression.  This region had the 
most complete data set of all three regions in this analysis, which may indicate RMA is able to 
rate this region more accurately.   
The results from the Iowa regression appear to reaffirm this, as coefficients for expected 
revenue from corn and soybeans are similar to the previous regressions, but the net value 
coefficients are not.  In the Iowa analysis, all net value coefficients are positive, but only the 
one-year moving average is statistically significant.  However, the previous regressions show 
that the moving averages greater in length most accurately reflect the true nature of the 
situation. 
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5.1 – Tables and Figures 
 
Table 10: 
SARAR Fixed Effects Panel Model 
       
Midwest - 985 Counties 
Number of Years of 
Average Previous Net 
Value 
1 Year   3 Year   5 Year   
 
      
Net Value 0.0011  0.0039  0.0096 * 
 (0.0014)  (0.0029)  (0.0043)  
Expected Revenue - 
Corn 
0.0156 *** 0.0157 *** 0.0158 *** 
 
(0.0019)  (0.0019)  (0.0019) 
 
Expected Revenue - 
Soybeans 
0.0034  0.0033  0.0031  
 
(0.0027)  (0.0027)  (0.0027) 
 
       
Spatial Error -0.624 *** -0.624 *** -0.624 *** 
Coefficient 0.0239  0.0239  0.0239  
       
Spatial Lag 0.911 *** 0.911 *** 0.911 *** 
Coefficient 0.0057  0.0057  0.0057  
 
      
              
 
0.98175  0.98175  0.98176  
Observations 7880  7880  7880  
Counties 985  985  985  
              
*P<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001; Standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 12: 
 
SARAR Regressions on Fixed Effect Estimates 
       
Midwest - 985 Counties 
Number of Years of 
Average Previous Net Value 
1 Year   3 Year   5 Year   
 
      
Soil 51.57 *** 51.66 *** 51.57 *** 
 (4.2616)  (4.2603)  (4.2616)  
StDev - Corn 0.0976  0.0953  0.0976  
 
(0.0771) 
 
(0.0771) 
 
(0.0771) 
 
StDev - Soybeans -0.6222 ** -0.6210 ** -0.6222 ** 
 (0.2257)  (0.2258)  (0.2257)  
GDD -0.0025 ** -0.0025 ** -0.0025 ** 
 (0.0009)  (0.0009)  (0.0009)  
 
 
     
Spatial Error -0.5050 *** -0.5066 *** -0.5090 *** 
Coefficient (0.1080)  (0.1078)  (0.1071)  
       
Spatial Lag 0.4372 *** 0.4388 *** 0.4420 *** 
Coefficient (0.0838)  (0.0835)  (0.0828)  
 
      
              
AIC 7611.5  7611.8  7612.7  
Observations 985  985  985  
Counties 985  985  985  
              
*P<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001; Standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 13: 
 
SARAR Random Effects Panel Model        
Midwest - 985 Counties 
Number of Years of 
Average Previous Net 
Value 
1 Year   3 Year   5 Year   
 
      
Net Value 0.0016  0.0008  0.0101 * 
 0.0017  0.0076  0.0050  
Soil 42.40 *** 94.25 *** 42.74 *** 
 2.5480 
 
7.4270 
 
2.5539 
 
Expected Revenue - Corn 0.0208 *** 0.0476 *** 0.0209 *** 
 
0.0020 
 
0.0047 
 
0.0020 
 
Expected Revenue - 
Soybeans 
0.0056 * 0.0123 ** 0.0055 * 
 
0.0028 
 
0.0037 
 
0.0027 
 
GDD -0.0021 ** 0.0068  -0.0021 ** 
 
0.0008  0.0029  0.0008  
Corn StDev 0.174 ** -0.011  0.164 ** 
 
0.0618  0.0939  0.0621  
Soybeans StDev -0.61 ** -0.35 * -0.60 ** 
 0.1912  0.2741  0.1912  
       
Time Fixed Effects YES  YES  YES  
State Fixed Effects YES  YES  YES  
       
Spatial Error -0.474 *** -0.564 *** -0.470 *** 
Coefficient 0.0273  0.0248  0.0272  
       
Spatial Lag 0.879 *** 0.947 *** 0.879 *** 
Coefficient 0.0070  0.0043  0.0069  
 
      
              
 
0.81549  0.80573  0.81581  
Observations 7880  7880  7880  
Counties 985  985  985  
              
 
𝑟2 
69 
 
Table 14: 
 
Panel Fixed Effects Model - Non-Spatial        
Midwest - 985 Counties 
Number of Years of 
Average Previous Net 
Value 
1 Year   3 Year   5 Year   
 
      
Net Value 0.0019  0.1155 *** 0.3325 *** 
 0.0050  0.0099  0.0127  
Expected Revenue - 
Corn 
-0.0089 *** -0.0016  -0.0009  
 
0.0022  0.0022  0.0021  
Expected Revenue - 
Soybeans 
0.1324 *** 0.1105 *** 0.1065 *** 
 
0.0044  0.0047  0.0043  
       
Spatial Error 
No 
 
No 
 
No 
 
Coefficient    
       
Spatial Lag 
No 
 
No 
 
No 
 
Coefficient    
 
      
              
 0.28542  0.29917  0.35003  
Observations 7880  7880  7880  
Counties 985  985  985  
              
*P<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001; Standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 15: 
 
SARAR Fixed Effects Panel Model 
       
Northern Plains -  288 Counties 
Number of Years of 
Average Previous Net 
Value 
1 Year   3 Year   5 Year   
 
      
Net Value 0.0002  0.0065  0.0298 ** 
 (0.0030)  (0.0063)  (0.0095)  
Expected Revenue - 
Corn 
0.0092 ** 0.0092 *** 0.0095 *** 
 
(0.0028)  (0.0028)  (0.0028) 
 
Expected Revenue - 
Soybeans 
0.0035  0.0032  0.0024  
 
(0.0042)  (0.0042)  (0.0042) 
 
       
Spatial Error -0.366 *** -0.366 *** -0.363 *** 
Coefficient 0.0542  0.0542  0.0544  
       
Spatial Lag 0.917 *** 0.917 *** 0.914 *** 
Coefficient 0.0111  0.0111  0.0115  
 
      
              
 
0.98153  0.98153  0.98155  
Observations 2304  2304  2304  
Counties 288  288  288  
              
*P<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001; Standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 16:  
 
SARAR Fixed Effects Panel Model        
Lake States -  223 Counties 
Number of Years of 
Average Previous Net 
Value 
1 Year   3 Year   5 Year   
 
      
Net Value -0.0012  0.0256 ** 0.0268 * 
 (0.0068)  (0.0093)  (0.0125)  
Expected Revenue - 
Corn 
0.1122 *** 0.0496 *** 0.0488 *** 
 
(0.0133)  (0.0068)  (0.0067) 
 
Expected Revenue - 
Soybeans 
0.0059  -0.0040  -0.0041  
 
(0.0061)  (0.0047)  (0.0047) 
 
       
Spatial Error -0.224 ** -0.219 ** 0.227 ** 
Coefficient 0.0712  0.0743  0.0738  
       
Spatial Lag 0.838 *** 0.817 *** 0.820 *** 
Coefficient 0.0235  0.0256  0.0251  
 
      
              
 
0.91793  0.97485  0.97483  
Observations 1784  1784  1784  
Counties 223  223  223  
              
*P<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001; Standard errors in parentheses 
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 Table 17: 
 
SARAR Fixed Effects Panel Model        
Corn Belt -  474 Counties 
Number of Years of 
Average Previous Net 
Value 
1 Year   3 Year   5 Year   
 
      
Net Value 0.0037  0.0046  0.0012  
 (0.0024)  (0.0047)  (0.0069)  
Expected Revenue - 
Corn 
0.0202 *** 0.0193 *** 0.0192 *** 
 
(0.0047)  (0.0047)  (0.0047) 
 
Expected Revenue - 
Soybeans 
0.0348 *** 0.0363 *** 0.0352 *** 
 
(0.0089)  (0.0090)  (0.0089) 
 
       
Spatial Error -0.627 *** -0.627 *** -0.627 *** 
Coefficient 0.0306  0.0306  0.0306  
       
Spatial Lag 0.875 *** 0.875 *** 0.875 *** 
Coefficient 0.0100  0.0100  0.0099  
 
      
              
 
0.97366  0.97366  0.97366  
Observations 3792  3792  3792  
Counties 474  474  474  
              
*P<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001; Standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 18: 
 
SARAR Fixed Effects Panel Model        
Iowa -  99 Counties 
Number of Years of 
Average Previous Net 
Value 
1 Year   3 Year   5 Year   
 
      
Net Value 0.0233 * 0.0214  0.0048  
 0.0094  0.0186  0.0285  
Expected Revenue - 
Corn 
0.0866 *** 0.0807 *** 0.0749 *** 
 
0.0226  0.0226  0.0225 
 
Expected Revenue - 
Soybeans 
0.0205  0.0320  0.0302  
 
0.0514  0.0513  0.0515 
 
       
Spatial Error -0.402 ** -0.407 ** -0.399 ** 
Coefficient 0.1359  0.1346  0.1351  
       
Spatial Lag 0.803 *** 0.812 *** 0.813 *** 
Coefficient 0.0441  0.0424  0.0426  
 
      
              
 0.98153  0.98153  0.98155  
Observations 792  792  792  
Counties 99  99  99  
              
*P<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001; Standard errors in parentheses 
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CHAPTER 6 – CONCLUSION 
Crop insurance has changed drastically over the past 70 years.  RMA and other agencies 
continue to improve the performance of products offered to producers, driven largely by the 
increased quantity and quality of data.  Demand from the public and the agricultural industry 
for better performance from crop insurance products will continue to drive innovation in the 
Federal crop insurance program.  However, the rating system is a slowly healing mechanism 
that has developed spatially correlated patterns of over-payments and under-payments. While 
crop insurance should pay out the subsidy per acre on average, net value from crop insurance is 
often a significantly different value, even when averaged through time and space.  For now, the 
variation in net value from crop insurance across counties, states, and regions provide excellent 
opportunities for analysis. This study confirms that producers factor a proportion of crop 
insurance into cash rents as the consistency of net value of crop insurance increases.  However, 
the magnitude to which producers factor a proportion of net value into cash rents contrasts 
previous analyses of different forms of government payments.   
Given the complexity of the data and the way in which the data were aggregated, the true 
impact of the net value of crop insurance on cash rents is difficult to disentangle. Thus, one 
must avoid the fallacy of the inverse when interpreting the results in this analysis. Simply 
because the economic significance of the results is difficult to directly assess, it does not imply 
the elimination of the Federal crop insurance program would not have significant economic 
consequences.  The determination of crop insurance premiums, how cash rents are established, 
and whether a producer elects to purchase crop insurance are so intertwined that the modeling 
approach used in this analysis likely diminishes the results.  
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The inclusion of much more granular data would immensely aid a future study of this nature.   
Nuances, such as preventive plant or specific products, may exist in the crop insurance program 
that producers exploit more or less frequently than other aspects of the program.  While not 
currently feasible, the reconciliation of data on farmland values and attributes, producer 
characteristics, and parcel-specific crop insurance loss history would paint a more vivid picture 
of the impact of crop insurance on cash rents.  Big data will undoubtedly serve a larger role in 
the success or failure of the Federal crop insurance program moving forward.   
The findings in this thesis provide valuable insight to policy planners in the future Farm Bill 
debates.  The balance between large enough subsidy rates to maintain widespread 
participation while simultaneously facing scrutiny over the scale of the federal crop insurance 
program will continue to challenge lawmakers.  As margins for producers tighten due to 
depressed commodity prices, producers may either embrace crop insurance as a valuable risk 
management tool or opt to forgo the purchase of crop insurance altogether.  While subsidies 
have helped lower the cost of crop insurance for producers, producers operating on low risk 
farmland are the most likely candidates to first opt out of crop insurance.  This move would 
only exacerbate the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard that historically plagued 
crop insurance.   
Government support for agriculture remains an important factor in the evolution of the 
agricultural industry.  Economies of scale and scope continue to drive consolidation while 
simultaneously promoting efficiencies.  Technology and precision agriculture aid in the 
migration towards increasingly efficient operations, but at an ever-increasing cost to producers.   
Federal farm programs enhance a producer’s ability to address inefficiencies through capital 
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investments.  While moral hazard historically has plagued the crop insurance program, the 
program also encourages capital investments that improve efficiencies.  As cash rent leasing 
agreements continue to grow in popularity, crop insurance’s role as a revenue safety net will 
also continue to grow.   
The identification strategy used in this analysis performs best with RMA data. However, tools 
such as iFarm’s crop insurance decision tool may prove more useful in predicting future year’s 
net values.  The iFarm net cost values represent the expected long run averages plus/minus 
some effect of the most recent events, and are more responsive to rating changes.  Further 
study of the effect of the net value of crop insurance is needed as producers learn from their 
own experiences with crop insurance. 
The research question and subsequent results outlined in this analysis represent a small 
fraction of the research that focuses on the impacts government payments can have farmland 
values.  As government payments to producers change and are refined, how producers respond 
to these programs will undoubtedly present future researchers with both identification 
challenges and analysis opportunities. The ability to quantify the impacts of any form of 
government payments to producers is valued by producers, lenders, investors, and anyone else 
with a stake in agriculture.    
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APPENDIX A: CROP INSURANCE LOSS RATIO MAPS 
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APPENDIX B: NET VALUE FROM CROP INSURANCE MAPS 
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